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Judicial Power and the Administrative State
Judge James L. Dennis*
Article V of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution ("Article V")
furthers the same basic objects and values that are promoted by
Article III of the United States Constitution ("Article III"): the
establishment of an independent judiciary to serve as a barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the legislative and executive
branches; to provide impartial administration of the laws; to enforce
the limited constitution's specified exceptions to the legislative
authority; to interpret the constitution and laws as its proper and
peculiar province; and to guard the constitution and the rights of
individuals and minorities from dangerous innovations and serious
oppressions by the representatives of the people.' This essay seeks
to evaluate and gain insight into the meaning of Article V and its role
in the modem administrative state by comparing and contrasting its
characteristics with that of Article III in view of the jurisprudence and
scholarly commentary resulting from the proliferation of
administrative agencies authorized to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
The modem administrative state magnifies the danger of
encroachment upon judicial power and jurisdiction by the legislative
and executive branches through the creation of administrative
agencies with adjudicatory powers. To the detriment of the general
public interest, an agency can be co-opted by the special interests that
the legislature authorized it to regulate.2 A highly organized interest
group may have sufficient political influence to induce the legislative
branch to expand a captured agency's adjudicatory jurisdiction in
order to remove matters from the initial jurisdiction of the courts. 3
Unless the courts maintain their independence, disallow
unconstitutional intrusions into judicial power, and exercise
meaningful appellate review of agency adjudications, the judicial
power necessary to protect individuals from the effects of biased,
Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Delegate, Chairman of Judiciary Committee, Louisiana Constitutional Convention
of 1973.
1. See The Federalist No. 78, at 522, 524-25, 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
2. Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Sidney Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1175, 1208-09 (1981).
3. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1998); David Dana & Susan P.
Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 497
(1999).
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arbitrary, or oppressive governmental and bureaucratic action can be
undermined.4
I.
Article V vests the state judicial power and general jurisdiction
directly in courts established or authorized by the state constitution.
Unlike Article III, the Louisiana judiciary article does not merely
establish a supreme court and authorize the legislative branch to
ordain and establish limited jurisdiction inferior courts.
Consequently, Article V differs significantly from Article III in this
respect, but otherwise serves the same essential constitutional
purpose, viz., the establishment of an independent judiciary to
enforce the separation of powers doctrine, checks and balances, and
other constitutional limitations upon the powers of the executive and
legislative branches.
The first section of the judiciary article of the state and federal
constitutions establishes a supreme court and vests all of the judicial
power in it and other courts. Article V, Section 1 of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution states that "[t]he judicial power is vested in a
supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts
authorized by this Article."5 Article III, Section 1 of the United
States Constitution provides, in part, that "[tihe judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."6 The most significant difference between the provisions,
of course, is that the Louisiana legislature is permitted to create courts
only below the district court level as authorized by Article V, but
Congress is empowered by Article III to establish all courts "inferior"
to the supreme court. Congress could establish any number of
inferior Article III courts, or it could elect to create none, allowing the
state courts to have initial jurisdiction of all litigation over which the
Supreme Court's judicial power extends. The Louisiana legislature
may shape the court system only at the fourth level, below the district
courts, within limits prescribed by Article V.
4. For recent Louisiana developments raising Article V-separation of powers
questions beyond the scope of this essay, see Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, AI]
Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana's
Administrative Procedure Act, 59 La. L. Rev. 431 (1999); see generally
Corrections Administrative Procedure Act, La. R.S. 15:1171-1177 (1992) (creates
multi-stage administrative system in the Department of Corrections, sheriffs'
departments, and district courts, for processing and screening of prisoners' civil
suits, prior to or in lieu of their being considered as civil matters within the originaljurisdiction of the district courts).
5. La. Const. art. V, § 1.
6. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
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The two judiciary articles promote judicial independence in
different ways. Article V, Section 21 provides that "[t]he term of
office, retirement benefits, and compensation of ajudge shall not be
decreased during the term for which he is elected."7 Section 22 of
Article V provides that all judges shall be elected, except for
appointees temporarily filling vacancies. Article III states that "[t]he
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office."8 Federal judges are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.' Although
Louisiana judges are elected for six and ten year terms, rather than
appointed for life during good behavior as are federal Article IIIjudges, they are electorally accountable only within their districts, and
therefore enjoy independence from control by the executive or
legislative branch. A Louisiana judge is not protected against
diminution in compensation during his or her entire continuance in
office, but is protected from a reduction of compensation, retirement
benefits, and terms of office during the term for which the judge is
elected.
The jurisdictional provisions of Article III confine judicial power
more narrowly and afford it less protection from executive and
legislative incursions than those of Article V. Federal courts are
courts of limited, not general, jurisdiction. They are empowered to
hear only cases that are within the judicial power of the United States,
as defined in Article 111,10 and that are within ajurisdictional grant by
Congress. " Louisiana's district courts, appellate courts, and supreme
court, like those of most states, are courts of general jurisdiction, and
the presumption is that they have subject matter jurisdiction unless a
7. La. Const. art. V, § 21.
8. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
9. U.S. Const. art. II,,§ 2.
10. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; ... Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;... Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party; ... Controversies between two or more States; ...
between a State and Citizens of another State; ... between Citizens of
different States.... between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
11. 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522 (2d
ed. 1984) [hereinafter Wright]; see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
Des Bauxites De Guiiee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
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showing is made to the contrary.'2 Article V, Section 16 provides,
with few exceptions, that the district courts "shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters."' 3 Article V divides the
general appellate jurisdiction over district court cases between the
supreme court and the courts of appeal, according to case
classification. 4 Article V vests in the supreme court general
supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts, and supervisory
jurisdiction in each court of appeal over cases which arise within its
district.'"
In both the state and federal systems, litigation has arisen over
whether an unconstitutional divestment of judicial power results
when the legislative branch authorizes an executive or administrative
officer to perform adjudicatory functions. Neither Article III nor
Article V defines the terms "vested" and "judicial power."
Additionally, Article V does not provide a definition of the "original
jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters" that is vested in a district
court. The Louisiana cases have concerned whether the adjudication
of a particular matter by an executive or administrative adjudicator
would unconstitutionally divest a "civil matter" from the district
courts' "original jurisdiction." A much larger number of federal
cases have dealt with the related question of whether Congress
violated Article III by assigning to executive or administrative
officers, who do not have constitutionally guaranteed life tenure or
undiminished compensation during their continuance in office, the
power to adjudicate cases or controversies that would otherwise fall
within the jurisdiction of Article III courts.
12. See West v. Town of Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1968);
Wright, supra note 11, at § 3522; 21 C.J.S. Courts § 74 (1990) (citing, inter alia,
Conner v. Conner, 231 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. App. 1976); Evans v. Advance Sch., Inc.,
388 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1979); Walles v. Int'l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers,
AFL-CIO, 252 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1977)).
13. La. Const. art. V, § 16.
14. La. Const. art. V affirmatively vests (1) the supreme court with general
supervisory jurisdiction over all other state courts, original jurisdiction of bar
disciplinary proceedings, and appellate jurisdiction of cases in which a law or
ordinance has been declared unconstitutional or a person has been sentenced to
death; (2) the courts of appeal with supervisory jurisdiction over cases which arise
within their circuits; and appellate jurisdiction (except for that vested in the
supreme court) of all civil matters, including direct review of administrative agency
determinations in workers' compensation matters, all matters appealed from family
and juvenile courts, all criminal cases triable by a jury (except those appealable
directly to the supreme court), and administrative agency determinations as
provided by the Constitution; and (3) the district courts with original jurisdiction
of all criminal matters, all civil matters, except as provided for by the Constitution,
and appellate jurisdiction as provided by law. See La. Const. art. V, §§ 5, 10 & 16.
15. La. Const. art. V, §§ 5 & 10.
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IIo
In the federal system the assignment of adjudicatory functions to
executive and administrative tribunals has produced a long and
sometimes tortuous history of Supreme Court decisions. From the early
days of the nation, Congress has enacted laws placing the power of
adjudication of certain matters in non-Article Im officers, i.e., officers
who do not enjoy the safeguards of life tenure and undiminishable salary.
In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,16 the
Supreme Court recognized a category of "public rights" whose
adjudication, though a judicial act, Congress may assign to tribunals
lacking the essential characteristics of Article III courts. This doctrine
has been "explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of
sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the Government may attach
conditions to its consent to be sued." 7 But the public-rights doctrine also
has been said to "draw[] upon the principle of separation of powers, and
a historical understanding that certain prerogatives were reserved to the
political Branches of Government."'" Thus, the public-rights doctrine
was said to "extend[] only to matters arising 'between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments,' and only to matters that historically could have been
determined exclusively by those departments."' 9
In American Insurance Co. v. Canter,2" Chief Justice Marshall held
that Congress may create non-Article Im courts to adjudicate disputes in
the federal territories, based on the much criticized theory that their
jurisdiction is not part of the Article III judicial power, "but is conferred
by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body
possesses over the territories of the United States."' Under the influence
of these decisions, the Court ratified the courts martial,22 and Congress,
apparently based on the public rights concept, created the Court of
Claims, a court of private land claims, and a court of customs and patent
appeals.23
16. 59 U.S. (18 Howard) 272 (1856).
17. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,67,
102 S. Ct. 2858, 2869 (1982) (citing Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 Howard) at 283-
85).
18. 458 U.S. at 67, 102 S. Ct. at 2869.
19. Id. at 67-68, 102 S. Ct. at 2869 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
50, 52 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1932)) (citation omitted).
20. 26 U.S. (1 Peters) 511 (1828).
21. Id. at 546.
22. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17, 76 S. Ct. 1, 5(1955).
23. See Wilber Griffith Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
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The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has remained settled with
respect to non-Article III legislative courts and tribunals for the
adjudication of public rights. However, the Court has struggled
unsuccessfully during the past two decades for a clear answer to the
question of when Congress may establish non-Article III
administrative tribunals for the adjudication of civil cases or
controversies between private citizens of the states.
Near the beginning of the New Deal, the Supreme Court approved
the use of legislative courts for private law matters when those
tribunals serve as "adjuncts" to Article III courts. In 1932, the
Supreme Court, in Crowell v. Benson, 4 for the first time approved of
a non-Article III tribunal for the adjudication of private rights,25 i.e.,
"the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined. 26
The challenged statute authorized an administrative agency, the
United States Employees' Compensation Commission, to make
factual determinations with respect to employers' liability to their
employees for work-related injuries under the Longshoremen's and
Harborworkers' Compensation Act.27  The Court noted that the
statute provided for compensation of injured employees "irrespective
of fault" and prescribed a fixed, mandatory schedule of
compensation. 2' The agency was assigned the role of deciding
"questions of fact as to the circumstances, nature, extent, and
consequences of the injuries sustained by the employee for which
compensation is to be made .... ,29 "The agency did not possess the
power to enforce any of its compensation orders: On the contrary,
every compensation order was appealable to the appropriate federal
district court, which had the sole power to enforce it or set it aside,
depending upon whether the court determined it to be 'in accordance
with law' and supported by evidence in the record.""0 The Crowell
Court concluded that the Commission's determinations were "closely
analogous to the findings of the amount of damages that are made,
according to familiar practice, by commissioners or assessors....,,II
Stating that "there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
894, 904-11 (1930); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 916, 922 (1988) [hereinafter Fallon].
24. 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).
25. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 4.5.2, at 235-36 (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter Chernerinsky].
26. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51, 52 S. Ct. at 285.
27. Id. at 36-37, 52 S. Ct. at 286-87.
28. Id. at 38, 52 S. Ct. at 287.
29. Id. at 54, 52 S. Ct. at 293.
30. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,78,
102 S. Ct. 2858, 2875 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 44-45, 48, 52 S. Ct. at 290-91).
31. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54, 52 S. Ct. at 293.
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essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in
constitutional courts shall be made by judges,"32 the Court held that
the statutory design did not violate Article III. 3 The Court also held
that in private law matters Article III courts have ultimate decision-
making authority, there must be substantial oversight of legislative
courts by an Article III court, and that Article III courts must be able
to decide de novo all questions of law, constitutional facts, and
jurisdictional facts.34
In 1982, however, the Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 3' apparently moved by
a concern that Congress might assign vast areas of private rights
litigation to legislative courts, held, without a majority opinion, that
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violated Article III by granting non-
Article III bankruptcy judges broad jurisdiction to decide private
disputes in "civil proceedings arising under... [the Act] or arising in
or related to cases arising under [it]. ' '36  Northern Pipeline
Construction had filed for bankruptcy and filed a claim against
Marathon Pipe Line for breach of contract in the bankruptcy court.37
Marathon Pipe Line, which had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy
proceedings, argued that the breach of contract claim could not
constitutionally be adjudicated in the bankruptcy court because its
judges lacked life tenure and the salary protections of Article III
judges.38
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four, set forth a four
part rationale. First, the judicial power of the United States must be
exercised by judges who have the attributes of life tenure and
protection against salary diminution specified by Article III, which
were incorporated into the Constitution to ensure the independence
of the Judiciary from the control of the Executive and Legislative
Branches.39 Second, non-Article III legislative courts are permitted
in a few historically recognized instances-for 'territories, the
military, and public rights disputes-but the bankruptcy courts do not
fit into any of these exceptions.4' Third, legislative courts also can be
32. Id. at 51, 52 S. Ct. at 292.
33. Id. at 54, 52 S. Ct. at 293-94.
34. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, § 4.5.2, at 237 ("In general, Crowell remains
good law in that [constitutional facts] may be relitigated, de novo, in an Article III
federal court... The jurisdictional fact doctrine, however, is no longer followed
and has seldom been mentioned since Crowell.") (footnotes omitted).
35. 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
36. Id. at 54, 102 S. Ct. at 2862 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed. Supp.
IV)).
37. Id. at 56, 102 S. Ct. at 2864.
38. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, § 4.5.3, at 244.
39. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59, 102 S. Ct. at 2865.
40. Id. at 62-71, 102 S. Ct. at 2867-71.
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used as adjuncts to Article III courts under limited circumstances,
e.g., as in Crowell, in which the agency was limited to jurisdiction in
a particular area of law, it could not enforce its own orders, and its
decision could be overturned by the district court "if not supported by
the evidence."'" However, under the 1978 Act the bankruptcy courts
have jurisdiction over all civil matters, can enforce their own orders
and exercise all of the powers of federal district courts, and their
rulings can be set aside only upon "clear error. 4 2 Fourth, the
argument in support of the bankruptcy courts based on token judicial
review, i.e., that Article III is satisfied so long as there is available
some degree of appellate review by a constitutional court, is without
merit. 43  "Our precedents make it clear that the constitutional
requirements for the exercise of the judicial power must be met at all
stages of adjudication . . . .." The plurality concluded that the
declaration of unconstitutionality could not be limited to the plenary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts because it is uncertain whether
Congress would have enacted the statute without the jurisdictional
section.45
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the judgment and
concluded that because Marathon Pipe Line was named simply as a
defendant on a contract claim arising under state law, the
constitutionality of the bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction
over that kind of suit was all that needed to be decided. 46 They stated
that it was unconstitutional to vest in the bankruptcy courts broad
authority to adjudicate state law matters that were only peripherally
related to the adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law,47 and that
the extent of review by Article III courts provided on appeal by the
Act did not cure the constitutional defect under the rule espoused in
Crowell.4' They argued that because all matters of fact and law in
whatever domains of law the dispute may lead were to be decided by
the bankruptcy court in the first instance, with only traditional
appellate review by Article III courts contemplated, the bankruptcy
court was "not an 'adjunct' of either the district court or the court of
appeals. '49 Finally, they concluded that whether the prior cases
support a general proposition and three tidy exceptions, as the
plurality suggested, did not need to be decided, as none of the cases
41. Id. at 77-78, 102 S. Ct. at 2875.
42. Id. at 84-86, 102 S. Ct. at 2878-79.
43. Id.. at 86 n.39, 102 S. Ct. at 2879.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 87 n.40, 102 S. Ct. at 2880.
46. Id. at 89-90, 102 S. Ct. at 2881 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 90-92, 102 S. Ct. at 2881-82.
48. Id. at 91, 102 S. Ct. at 2882 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
49. Id.
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had gone so far as to sanction the type of litigation to which Marathon
would be subjected to against its will under the 1978 Act.5 0
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell,
dissented on the ground that a functional approach should be used to
analyze the constitutionality of legislative courts concentrating on
whether a particular court undermines checks and balances and
separation of powers. Justice White stated:
The inquiry should, rather, focus equally on those Art[icle] III
values and ask whether and to what extent the legislative
scheme accommodates them or, conversely, substantially
undermines them. The burden on Art[icle] III values should
then be measured against the values Congress hopes to serve
through the use of Art[icle] I courts.5'
Justice White concluded that Congress understandably was reluctant
to create several hundred bankruptcy specialistjudges with life tenure
to address what may be a comparatively temporary plethora of such
cases, and that the existence of traditional appellate review by Article
III courts provided a sufficient rule of law check in this particular
case, emphasizing that when a legislative court is "designed to deal
with issues likely to be of little interest to the political branches,"
there is no fear that Congress is creating such tribunals to aggrandize
its own power. 2
In two cases after Northern Pipeline considering legislative
courts' adjudications of private law disputes, the Court adopted an
approach similar to that espoused by Justice White in his Northern
Pipeline dissent: balancing the adverse impact on Article III values
with the justification for use of a legislative court. Balancing such
indeterminate values has instilled more unpredictability in an already
uncertain area of law.
In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.," the
Court held that Article III does not prohibit Congress from selecting
binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the
mechanism for resolving disputes between private participants in the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") 54
pesticide registration program. FIFRA authorizes the EPA to use a
previous applicant's research data in considering another
manufacturer's application for a "follow-on" registration of a similar
50. Id.
51. Id. at 115, 102 S. Ct. at 2894 (White, J. dissenting).
52. Id. at 115, 102 S. Ct. at 2894.
53. 473 U.S. 568, 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).
54. FIFRA requires manufacturers of pesticides, as a precondition for
registering a pesticide, to submit research data to the EPA concerning the product's
health, safety, and environmental effects. Id. at 571, 105 S. Ct. at 3328.
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product." The EPA may consider such data only if the "follow on"
registrant offers to compensate the original applicant for use of the
data, and, if they disagree on compensation, the EPA may submit the
dispute to binding arbitration.56 Judicial review was limited to
instances of "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.""7 A
plurality, led by Justice O'Connor, distinguished Northern Pipeline
as establishing only "that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law,
without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate
review."5 8 In approving the arbitration scheme, the plurality adopted
a functional approach, considering the desirability of a non-Article III
tribunal and the degree of encroachment on the federal judiciary.
Significantly, the plurality rejected the Northern Pipeline plurality's
rationale that there were only four situations in which legislative
courts could be used: territorial disputes, military cases, public rights
matters, and as adjuncts to Article III courts. 9 The plurality
emphasized, however, that "Congress, acting for a valid legislative
purpose pursuant to [Article I], may create a seemingly 'private' right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be
a matter appropriate for agency resolution. 60
Justice Brennan, with Justices Marshall and Blackmun, concurred
in the result, stating that "the FIFRA compensation scheme
challenged in this case should be viewed as involving a matter of
public rights as that term is understood in the line of cases
culminating in Northern Pipeline."'6' Justice Brennan noted that the
dispute arose "in the. context of a federal regulatory scheme that
virtually occupies the field' 62 and that "at its heart the dispute
involves the exercise of authority by a Federal Government arbitrator
in the course of administration ofFIFRA's comprehensive regulatory
scheme."63
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,6 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, held that the
Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") did not violate Article III in
authorizing the Commodities Future Trading Commission ("CFTC")
55. Id. at 571-72, 105 S. Ct. at 3328.
56. Id. at 573, 105 S. Ct. at 3329.
57. Id. at 573-74, 105 S. Ct. at 3329.
58. Id. at 584, 105 S. Ct. at 3334.
59. Id. at 585-86, 105 S. Ct. at 3335.
60. Id. at 593-94, 105 S. Ct. at 3339-40.
61. Id. at 600, 105 S. Ct. at 3343 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 600-01, 105 S. Ct. at 3343.
64. 478 U.S. 833, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
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to entertain a professional commodity broker's private state law
counterclaim for a debit balance account against a customer who had
filed a federal law reparation claim against the broker under the Act
for fraudulent or manipulative conduct. First, the opinion reasoned
that Article III serves both to protect the role of the independent
judiciary as an inseparable element of the constitutional system of
separation of powers and checks and balances, and to preserve
litigants' interests in an impartial and independent federal
adjudication of claims to which the federal judicial power extends. 65
Second, the Court found that the customer, Schor, waived any
personal right he had under Article III to a trial of the counterclaim
in an Article III court because he elected to forgo his right to
commence his claim in a state or Article III court, filing it instead in
the CFTC and demanding that the broker dismiss his previous federal
court diversity suit, in which Schor had counterclaimed and which
involved the same two claims.66
Third, institutionally, rather than as a matter of personal right,
separation of powers principles inherent in Article III are not subject
to waiver or consent for the same reason that parties cannot confer
subject-matter jurisdiction by consent. The CFTC's jurisdiction of
the common-law counterclaim does not violate the nonwaivable
protections which Article III affords separation of powers
principles. In determining whether a congressional assignment ofan
adjudication of Article III business to a non-Article III tribunal
impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch, the Court must weigh a number of factors, none of which is
determinative, with an eye to the practical effect on the constitutional
role of the judiciary, including:
the extent to which the 'essential attributes ofjudicial power'
are reserved to Article III courts,... the extent to which the
non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins
and. importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements
of Article 111.68
Fourth, the Court found that Congress's allocation of power to the
CFTC does not impermissibly intrude on the province ofthejudiciary
for two reasons. First, the CFTC's adjudicatory powers depart from
the traditional agency model in only one respect: jurisdiction over
65. Id. at 849-50, 106 S. Ct. 3255-56.
66. Id. at 848-51, 106 S. Ct. 3256.
67. Id. at 850-51, 106 S. Ct. at 3256-57.
68. Id. at 851, 106 S. Ct. at 3257.
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common law counterclaims. 69 The CEA leaves more of the "essential
attributes ofjudicial power" to Article III courts than did that portion
of the Bankruptcy Act held unconstitutional by a majority in
Northern Pipeline.7" The CFTC, like the agency in Crowell, operates
only in a particular area of law, not broadly with all civil proceedings
related to bankruptcy cases as did the bankruptcy courts in Northern
Pipeline.7 CFTC orders are enforceable only by order of the district
court, and they are also reviewed under the same "weight of
evidence" standard sustained in Crowell, rather than the clear error
standard found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline.72 CFTC legal
determinations are subject to de novo review." The CFTC, unlike the
bankruptcy courts, does not exercise "all ordinary powers of district
courts" and may not preside over jury trials or issue writs of habeas
corpus.74 Second, although the nature of the claim is significant apart
from the method of its adjudication and the counterclaim asserted was
a private state-law right at the core of matters normally reserved to
Article III courts, the state law character of the claim is not
talismanic.75 The character of a claim is significant for the simple
reason that "private, common law rights were historically the types
of matters subject to resolution by Article III courts. 7 6 The risk of an
Article III violation is magnified when Congress allocates the
decision of a state private law claim to a non-Article III court.77
Accordingly, when such rights are at stake, an examination of the
congressional action has been searching.78 In this case, however, the
congressional grant of limited jurisdiction over a narrow class of
common law claims incidental to the primary, unchallenged
adjudicative function does not create a substantial threat to the
separation of powers.79 Further, Congress did not withdraw the claim
from jurisdiction of the state and Article III courts.8 0 Congress may
make available a "quasi-judicial mechanism through which willing
parties may, at their option, elect to resolve their differences."'
Justice Brennan,joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, stating that
he would limit the judicial authority of non-Article III federal
69. Id. at 852, 106 S. Ct. at 3257.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 852-53, 106 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
72. Id. at 853, 106 S. Ct. 3258.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 852-53, 106 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
75. Id. at 853, 106 S. Ct. at 3258.




80. Id. at 855, 106. S. Ct. at 3259.
81. Id.
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tribunals to the few, long-established exceptions described by the
plurality in Northern Pipeline and would countenance no further
erosion of Article III's mandate.82 After tracing the objects and
values the Framers sought to achieve by the separation of powers and
Article III, he maintained:
These important functions of Article III are too central to
our constitutional scheme to risk their incremental erosion.
The exceptions we have recognized for territorial courts,
courts-martial, and administrative courts were each based on
certain exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the
Constitution or by historical consensus. Here, however, there
is no equally forceful reason to extend further these
exceptions to situations that are distinguishable from existing
precedents. The Court, however, engages in just such an
extension. By sanctioning the adjudication of state-law
counterclaims by a federal administrative agency, the Court
far exceeds the analytic framework of our precedents....
Article III's prophylactic protections were intended to prevent
just this sort of abdication to claims of legislative
convenience.83
Although Thomas and Schor "rejected any attempt to make
determinative for Article III purposes the distinction between public
rights and private rights,"84 in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
Justice Brennan was able to make effective use of the distinction once
again, albeit for a more limited purpose.85 The question in
Granfinanciera was whether a person who has not filed a claim
against a bankruptcy estate, and therefore has not submitted to the
bankruptcy court's equity jurisdiction, has a right to ajury trial when
sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover an allegedly fraudulent
monetary transfer.86 Justice Brennan, writing for a six-member
majority, held that the Seventh Amendment entitles such a person to
a trial by jury, notwithstanding Congress's designation of fraudulent
conveyance actions as "core proceedings."87 First, the Court
determined that the nature of the relief that the trustee in bankruptcy
sought demonstrated that his cause of action should be characterized
as legal rather than equitable, such that the defendants in the suit were
82. Id. at 859, 106 S. Ct. at 3261 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 861-62, 863, 106 S. Ct. at 3262, 3263 (citations and quotations
omitted).
84. Id. at 853, 106 S. Ct. at 3258 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-86, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3335 (1985)).
85. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).
86. Id. at 36, 109 S. Ct. at 2787.
87. Id.
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prima facie entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.8
Second, the Court addressed whether Congress may assign or has
assigned resolution of the cause of action to a non-Article III
adjudicative body that does not use a jury as a factfinder.89 Relying
on "our decisions exploring the restrictions Article III places on
Congress'[s] choice of adjudicative bodies to resolve disputes over
statutory rights to determine whether petitioners are entitled to a jury
trial" in addition to Seventh Amendment precedents, the Court
concluded that the Federal Government need not be a party for a case
to revolve around public rights.90 Relying on Thomas, the court
stated:
The crucial question, in cases not involving the Federal
Government, is whether 'Congress, acting for a valid
legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under
Article I,[has] create[d] a seemingly 'private' right that is So
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be' a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited
involvement by the Article III judiciary. If a statutory right
is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program
Congress has power to enact, and if that right neither belongs
to nor exists against the Federal Government, then it must be
adjudicated by an Article III court. If the right is legal in
nature, then it carries with it the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of a jury trial.9
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that
"public rights" involve only cases with the United States as a party,
92
and he argued that "[t]his central feature of the Constitution must be
anchored in rules, not set adrift in some multifactored 'balancing
test."' 93  Whether Granfinanciera presages restoration of the
distinction between private rights and public rights remains to be
seen.
94
Furthermore, as Professor Chemerinsky notes, there are many
other questions still unanswered:
Is appellate review a prerequisite to the use of legislative
courts, or is its presence or absence simply one factor in the
88. Id. at 47-48, 109 S. Ct. at 2793.
89. Id. at 53, 109 S. Ct. 2796.
90. Id. at 54, 109 S. Ct. 2796-97.
91. Id. at 53-55, 109 S. Ct. at 2797.
92. Id. at 68, 109 S. Ct. at 2804 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 70, 109 S. Ct. at 2805.
94. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-5, at 278 (3d ed.
2000); Chemerinsky, supra note 25, § 4.5.4, at 255 n.96.
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balance? If appellate review must exist, what must be its
scope? Under what circumstances should a legislative court be
invalidated because of fairness considerations? ... Also, the
Court's balancing approach raises concerns that Congress can
eviscerate the jurisdiction of Article III courts by the slow
transfer of power on a case-by-case basis.95
III.
Although the decisions of the Supreme Court have failed to
produce a comprehensive set of principles for determining when a non-
Article III tribunal will be held to be an unconstitutional divestment of
judicial power, a number of scholars have provided some guidance.
Two have developed particularly cogent guidelines for deciding such
cases by debunking the literal meaning of Article III as a workable
legal rule or concept; identifying the objects and values implicit within
the literal meaning of Article III; and formulating precepts for usingjudicial review by Article III courts of non-Article III adjudications to
preserve and further Article III objects and values.96 For quick reading,
here is a condensed, simplified version of their ideas, relying on
quotations and close paraphrasing of their words.
(1) The literal meaning of Article III, as explained by Professor
Bator, is that if Congress decides to remove some of the antecedent
general jurisdiction of the state courts by assigning the adjudication of
cases enumerated in Article III to a federal tribunal, that tribunal must
be an "inferior Court" ordained pursuant to Article III and in
accordance with the tenure, salary, and "case-or-controversy"
restrictions.97 The Constitution adopts "a simple, majestic, and
powerful model": Congress may leave initial adjudication of some or
all of the Article III cases to the state courts, but if federal adjudication
is needed, the requirements of Article III automatically come into play
and specify what sorts of courts Congress must employ.98 The only
federal tribunals that can be legislatively authorized to decide cases
arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the
other kinds of cases listed in Article III, are Article III courts, whosejudges enjoy the safeguards of life tenure and undiminished salary.9
(2) For over 200 years, however, Congress has consistently acted
on the premise that it has the authority, if necessary and proper to the
95. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, § 4.5.4, at 255.
96. See generally, Paul M. Bator, The Constitution As Architecture: Legislative
and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 Ind. L.J. 233 (1990) [hereinafter
Bator]; Fallon, supra note 23.
97. Bator, supra note 96, at 234.
98. Id.
99. Fallon, supra note 23, at 919.
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exercise of its various substantive legislative powers, to constitute
special courts, tribunals, and agencies to adjudicate cases and
controversies arising under federal law. Yet these are not the
inferior courts specified in Article III, because their adjudicators do
not enjoy Article III's tenure and salary protections, and because
they have been entrusted with executive, legislative, or
administrative tasks outside the scope of the judicial power
extending to Article III cases and controversies.' And, during all
this time, with virtually equal consistency, courts have sustained
that exercise of power. 0
(3) Nevertheless, implicitly reflected in the literal words of
Article III and its guarantees of life tenure and nonreduction of
salary is the design to promote at least three sets of values.'02 First,
and most important, are the values implicit in the separation of
powers,"0 3 including the ideal of an independent judiciary. 10 4 The
Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers demonstrate
that the Framers intended to create a federal judiciary that, once
appointed, was to be as free from political and financial pressures
from the other branches as "the lot of humanity will admit."'05 The
Framers aimed to create a government capable of effective action,
but they feared the arbitrariness and tyranny that could result from
excessive concentration of power in a single branch. Believing that
the best safeguard lay in a structure in which the factional or self-
aggrandizing tendencies of any one branch could be checked by
another, the Framers viewed Article III's provision for a life-
tenured judiciary as crucial to the separation of powers. To subject
federal judges to political influence would have threatened the rule
of law.' 06 Although this constitutional framework has been largely
transformed by the rise of administrative agencies, separation of
powers concerns still pervade legal thought. The underlying
constitutional conception is that those with governmental power
must be subject to the limits of law, and that the limits should be
determined, not by those institutions whose authority is in question,
but by an impartial judiciary. 107 "[T]he absence of electoral
safeguards against arbitrary and self-interested bureaucratic
decisionmaking and the documented risk of agency susceptibility to
influence by private groups furnish compelling separation-of-
100. Bator, supra note 96, at 235.
101. Id.
102. Fallon, supra note 23, at 937.
103. Id.
104. Bator, supra note 96, at 235.
105. Id.
106. Fallon, supra note 23, at 937.
107. Id. at 938.
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powers arguments for retaining the Article III courts as guarantors
of agency fidelity to law."' 8
Second, Article III reflects the value of promoting fairness to
litigants. This value is especially important when a citizen advances
claims against the government or asserts an unpopular position in
order to guarantee adjudicative fairness. "An official who is
dependent on Congress or the executive for continuation in office
may be, or may appear to be, less impartial than a judge whose
continued tenure is assured."' 9
Third is the value ofjudicial integrity. Because of administrative
agencies' hybrid and problematic status, Congress frequently
provides for judicial review partly "to secure an imprimatur of
legitimacy for administrative action.""' That imprimatur cannot
properly be given if the reviewing court were not allowed to assess
the underlying lawfulness of an agency's decision. At some point
judicial integrity is compromised by limitations on the scope of
judicial review. "Possessed of no power 'over either the sword or the
purse,' article III courts ultimately function effectively only to the
extent that they command respect."'II
(4) There is an alternative "appellate review theory"' 12 of Article
III that promotes its objects and values, and affords permissible
accommodation to the reality of the administrative state and most of
the Supreme Court's precedents. Article III vests judicial power in
specified courts, extending it to nine enumerated classes of cases and
controversies. But, it does not define the term exercise, or explain
what participation in its exercise is required to constitute the exercise
of the federal judicial power. Nor does it require those courts to have
"a rigid monopoly over all aspects of the litigation from beginning to
end."' 3 It leaves open the possibility that the concept of the exercise
of the judicial power by Article III courts may include sufficient
participation to protect Article III values whether as a matter of
original or appellate jurisdiction. 14  By requiring appellate
jurisdiction in all cases decided initially by non-Article III
adjudicators, an appellate review theory complies with both the letter
and the spirit of the Constitution. The language is satisfied because
in every case that is adjudicated the federal judicial power is vested
in an Article III court, and the spirit is satisfied because the
jurisdiction of the constitutional court, if it is appellate rather than
108. Id.
109. Id. at 941.
110. Id. at 942.
111. Id.
112. Id. at933.




original, includes sufficiently searching review to protect Article III
values."' 5
(5) To implement this interpretation of Article III, each scholar
proposed his own appellate review theory rules.
Professor Bator proposed the rule that the federal judicial power
has been adequately vested in Article III courts if:
(i) the jurisdictional scheme, including its assignment of
initial jurisdiction to the agency, is a reasonably necessary
and proper way to achieve the ends of a valid federal
program; (ii) the procedures and constitution of the agency
comport with procedural due process; (iii) the scheme
satisfies the requirements of due process with respect to
judicial review; and (iv) the scheme gives an Article III court
ultimate power to control the legality and constitutionality of
the powers asserted and exercised.'' 6
Professor Fallon proposes a more elaborate appellate review
theory that he fills with greater detail after sketching its outline as
follows: (i) Article III does not forbid Congress from employing non-
Article III tribunals, at least in the first instance, in the adjudication
of any category of cases that might have been assigned to an Article
III court other than the Supreme Court;" 7 (ii) when Congress chooses
to use a non-Article III federal tribunal, it must also provide for
judicial review of at least some issues in an Article III court;" 8 (iii)
the issues for which appellate review must be provided are violations
of constitutional rights," 9 all questions of law (including public
rights),' constitutional facts (findings of facts that effectively
dispose of constitutional claims), jurisdictional facts' and possibly
liberty interests; 123 (iv) the requisite scope of review varies with the
issues: constitutional rights require de novo review;121 issues of law
require de novo review, which is compatible with the idea ofjudicial
deference insofar as the court decides whether the agency acted
within its authority and acknowledges the agency's expertise in
interpretation; 2 1 ordinary facts require relaxed, "substantial evidence"
115. Fallon, supra note 23, at 944.
116. Bator, supra note 96, at 267-68.
117. Fallon, supra note 23, at 949.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 975.
120. Id. at 976-77.
121. Id. at986.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 989.
124. Id. at 976.
125. Id. at 983-84.
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review'26 and constitutional and jurisdictional facts require de novo
review. 127
IV.
Meditation on the limits imposed by Article V of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution upon the legislative and judicial powers, with
respect to judicial and administrative jurisdiction, leads to at least four
separate inquiries. First, as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court, what is the general nature and scope of Article V judicial
power? Second, what insights for interpreting Article V's limits on
judicial and legislative power are provided by the models or
approaches to interpreting Article III? Third, in light of the Louisiana
and federal jurisprudence and commentary, what limits does Article V
place on the original jurisdiction of judicial and administrative
tribunals? Fourth, with the same considerations in mind, what does
Article V require with respect to judicial review of administrative
agency adjudications? Finally, has Article V served well as a
constitutional safeguard against legislative encroachment uponjudicial
independence through the creation of non-Article V adjudicatory
tribunals and as a basis for judicial review and enforcement of the
constitution and laws with respect to administrative, executive and
legislative actions and determinations?
a.
The Louisiana Supreme Court decisions interpreting the judiciary
articles of the 1974 and 1921 state constitutions generally reflect the
similarities and differences between the structure and concepts of the
state provisions and Article III of the United States Constitution. Prior
decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting and applying
Article III have been highly influential upon the state supreme court in
instances in which the state and federal constitutional provisions at
issue are structurally and conceptually similar.
"It is a well established rule of constitutional construction that
where a constitutional provision similar or identical to that used in a
prior constitution is adopted, it is presumed such provision was adopted
with the construction previously placed on it by the jurisprudence.' 128
Accordingly, in appropriate instances, we may rely on the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decisions under the 1921 state constitution in
interpreting Article V of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.
126. Id. at 989.
127. Id. 990.
128. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1167 (La. 1993).
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In principle, the Louisiana courts established by Article V are
courts of general, unlimited jurisdiction.1'29 Article V vests power and
jurisdiction directly in the courts it establishes and authorizes; the
legislature cannot confer or enlarge thejurisdiction of any court as the
jurisdiction of the courts is prescribed by the constitution. 3 In
contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A federal
court may adjudicate a case only if there is both a federal
constitutional and a federal statutory grant of jurisdiction. 3'
The requirement of ajusticiable controversy is firmly established
as a limitation upon the state courts' exercise of the judicial power by
the Louisiana Supreme Court cases arising under both the 1921 and
1974 state constitutions. In Perschall v. State, 32 the court observed
that "[t]hese traditional notions of justiciability are rooted in our
constitution's tripartite distribution of powers into the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government.' 33  Prior to
Perschall, the court consistently applied the justiciability prerequisite
as a constitutional orjurisdictional principle without fully explaining
that it is inherently required by the state constitutional system of
separation of powers and checks and balances, which replicates that
doctrine of the national Constitution.
34
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution plainly vests in courts
established and authorized by Article V the judicial power to declare
laws unconstitutional 35 and to review the actions of the executive
129. See West v. Town of Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1968).
130. State v. James, 329 So. 2d 713 (La. 1976); State v. Murphy, 254 La. 873,
227 So. 2d 915 (1969); Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Bd. For Marine Divers,
237 La. 467, 111 So. 2d 505, 514 n.4 (1959).
131. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, § 5.1, at 258 n.2:
See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (Congress creates
lower federal courts and thus has discretion to vest them with less than the
full jurisdiction allowed in Article III.)... The requirement that there be
a statutory provision for jurisdiction applies only to lower federal courts;
that is, a constitutional provision is sufficient for Supreme Court
jurisdiction, which is said to be 'self-executing.' But the Supreme Court
nonetheless always has acted as if Congress confers jurisdiction on it. See
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
132. 697 So. 2d 240 (La. 1997).
133. Id.at251.
134. See, e.g., St. Charles Parish v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1987);
State v. Bd. of Supervisors, 84 So. 2d 597, 599 (1955) ("Ever since 1810, it has
been fundamental in the law of Louisiana that courts sit to administer justice in
actual cases and that they do not and will not act on feigned ones, even with
consent of the parties.") (citing Livingston v. D'Orgenoy, D.C., 108 F. 469 (1809));
see also Livingston v. D'Orgenoy, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 87 (La. 1810); but see, In re Gulf
Oxygen Welder's Supply Profit Sharing Plan and Trust Agreement, 297 So. 2d 663
(La. 1974).
135. La. Const. art. V,'§ 5(D).
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branch of government. 36 The Louisiana Supreme Court consistently
has held under both the 1921 and 1974 state constitutions that it is the
final arbiter of the meaning of the state constitution and laws.13
Undoubtedly, these interpretations of the state constitutions, as well
as the adoption of Article V, § 5(D) itself, were influenced by Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison' and its progeny.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury established several
important principles concerning the federal judiciary, including: 39 (1)
the federal courts have the power to declare federal statutes
unconstitutional; 140 (2) the Supreme Court is the authoritative
interpreter of the federal Constitution and laws; ' 4' and (3) the federal
courts have the power to review the actions of the executive branch
of government.142
b.
The Louisiana constitutional system of checks and balances,
separation of powers, and, to a large extent, its judiciary article, are
modeled upon the national constitution. Therefore, because Article
V and Article III appear designed to promote the same basic values
and objects, Louisiana jurists and scholars should be aware of the
dialogue and criticisms among the advocates of the various federal
models or approaches to judiciary article interpretation. On the other
hand, because of the significant differences between the structures of
the two judiciary articles and between the fundamental concepts of
136. See, e.g., Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 711 So. 2d 675 (La. 1998);
Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Carso v. Bd. Of
Liquidation of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 17 So. 2d 358 (1944); Graham v. Jones,
198 La. 507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941).
137. See, e.g., Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1167 (La. 1993); State v.
Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 751 (La. 1992); Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213
La. 1, 34 So. 2d 331 (1948).
138. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
139. See generally, Chemerinsky, supra note 25, § 1.3, at 14-18.
140. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written").
141. Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is").
142. Id. at 163, 166:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. . . . But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that
[executive] officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to
perform certain acts; ... he is so far the officer of the law; is amendable
to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the
vested rights of others.
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the two constitutions, none of the federal models can be used as a
custom-made guidebook for resolving Article V controversies.
The United States Supreme Court decisions and scholarly
commentary suggest a number of models for interpreting Article III.
For present purposes, four models or approaches to Article III
interpretation also provide helpful insight to the analysis of
controversies involving Article III of the Louisiana Constitution: (1)
the literal model; (2) the categorical model; (3) the functional-
balancing model; and (4) the appellate review model. 143
In summary, the literal model is, of course, simply a literal
reading of Article III. This model has not proven to be practicable,
but Article III does evince the values and objects upon which the
other models draw. The categorical approach, which Justice Brennan
espoused in Northern Pipeline, asserts that the literal model states the
general rule, which has simply been subjected to a few narrow, well-
defined, specially justified, historical exceptions:' 4 (1) military
courts; (2) territorial courts; (3) courts created to adjudicate cases
involving "public rights;" and (4) adjunct tribunals, assigned limited
functions in such a way that the essential attributes ofjudicial power
are retained in the Article III court. 45 The functional-balancing
model asserts, first, that Article III must in proper circumstances give
way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate
"with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and
warranting distinctive treatment"' 46 where "resort to the initial
jurisdiction of an article III court may be ill adapted to the legitimate
substantive end;" 47 and, second, Article III "should be read as
expressing one value that must be balanced against competing
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities.' ' 48 In recent
cases, this view has been expressed by Justice White in his Northern
Pipeline dissent, and by Justice O'Connor in plurality and majority
opinions in Thomas and Schor. Finally, the appellate review model
is based on a simplified combination of the arguments of Professors
Fallon and Bator: Congress may give adjudicatory power to non-
Article III tribunals if the Article III courts have adequate power to
control the legality of the tribunals' exercise of adjudicatory power
through judicial review of law and facts (including constitutional
facts and law and the sufficiency of the evidence).
143. See Bator, supra note 96, at 240-63.
144. Id. at 243.
145. See generally Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
146. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 408, 93 S. Ct. 1670, 1681 (1973).
147. Bator, supra note 96, at 254.
148. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113, 102 S. Ct. at 2893 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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The Louisiana constitutional courts are courts of general
jurisdiction receiving their judicial power directly from the
constitution. Unlike a limited jurisdiction federal court, the Article
V courts are not dependent upon grants of jurisdiction from the
legislature. Although in a particular instance a Louisiana
constitutional provision may be congruent with aspects of a federal
model, in others the federal model may be irrelevant. Even when the
language of Article V and Article III are similar, the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation may be influenced by historical
events or governmental exigencies not relevant to the interpretation
of the Louisiana constitutional provision.
C.
In deciding whether a particular legislative act violates Article V,
Section 16(A) by transferring the original jurisdiction of a civil matter
from the district courts to an administrative agency, for example, the
federal models do not show the way but only warn of dangers to
avoid. The court, in making such a decision, usually will be guided
substantially by the plain words and structure of the constitutional
provisions. Article V, Sections 1 and 16 vest original jurisdiction of
virtually all civil and criminal matters in the district courts. 4 9 Article
V, Sections 1 and 15 exclude legislative power to establish courts
except for trial courts of limited jurisdiction with parishwide
territorial jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction uniform
throughout the state. 5 ' Article V, Sections 21, 22, and 23 bar the
exercise of a district court's jurisdiction by a non-elected judge
without the term, retirement, and compensation protections required
by those provisions.' 5' If, at the time the legislature acts, the civil
matter in question is within the original jurisdiction of the district
courts, the power of the legislature does not extend to the divestment
of the original jurisdiction of the district courts of that matter. Thus,
only a comparatively simple and straightforward inquiry by the court
into the familiar territory of its own jurisdiction is called for. It is not
appropriate or necessary for the court to engage in its own policy
balancing or to import arcane concepts from outside of the state
constitution or legal system.
Furthermore, Article V, Section 16 is substantially similar to
Article VII, Section 35, Clauses 3 and 4 of the 1921 Louisiana
Constitution vesting original jurisdiction of all civil matters in the
district courts, except such as may be vested in other courts
149. La. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 16.
150. La. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 15.
151. La. Const. art. V, §§ 21, 22, 23.
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authorized by the constitution. In cases governed by the 1974 and
1921 constitutional provisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the legislature cannot by statutory law enlarge the jurisdiction
conferred on the district courts by the constitution. 52 The words of
Article V, Section 16(A) provide a clear statement that the district
courts are constitutionally vested with original jurisdiction of all civil
matters, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, and it
could be inferred from the state supreme court's cases disallowing the
legislature's enlargement of thatjurisdiction that the court would also
hold an attempted statutory diminishment of that constitutionally
conferred judicial power unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, in 1988 the legislature enacted Act 938 of 1988
vesting in administrative hearing officers the "exclusive original
jurisdiction" to adjudicate workers' compensation claims.'53 In
Moore v. Roemer, 114 workers' compensation claimants and attorneys
brought an action seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of the
Act. 155  The Louisiana Supreme Court declared the Act
unconstitutional as an attempted legislative divestment of district
courts of the original jurisdiction of civil matters in violation of
Article V, Section 16 of the 1974 Constitution.'56 The rationale of the
court's holding was two-fold. First, Article V, Section 16's "original
jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction in the first instance. The legislature
may not alter the original jurisdiction of the district courts vested by
the constitution. The constitutional convention history indicates a
152. State v. James, 329 So. 2d 713 (La. 1976); Albert v. Parish of Rapides, 256
La. 566, 237 So. 2d 380 (1970); State v. Murphy, 254 La. 873, 227 So. 2d 915
(1969); Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Bd. For Marine Divers, 237 La. 467,
492, 111 So. 2d 505, 514 n.4 (1959); see also Twiggs v. Journeymen Barbers,
Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and Proprietors Int'l Union of America, Local 496
A.F.L., 58 So. 2d 298, 301 (La. App. Orl. 1952) (jurisdiction of courts flows from
constitutional grants and not from any act of the legislature). The district court had
original jurisdiction ofunemployment compensation claimant's petition forjudicial
review of the board of review of the Division of Employment Security. Bowen v.
Doyal, 259 La. 839, 851-56, 253 So. 2d 200, 205-06 (1971).
153. 1988 La. Acts No. 938.
154. 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990).
155. Id. at 78. The plaintiffs attacked the Act as violating Article V, § 16, of
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution vesting original jurisdiction of all civil matters,
including workers' compensation litigation, in the district courts; Article II, § 1,
dividing the powers of government into three separate branches and prohibiting
each branch from exercising the powers belonging to the others; Article V, § 1,
vesting the judicial power in the courts established and authorized by that article;
Article V, § 22, providing that all judges exercising the judicial powers vested in
those courts shall be elected; Article I, § 22, guaranteeing open courts accessible
to every person; as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Louisiana and United States Constitutions. Id. at 78 n.3.
156. Id. at 77.
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clear intent by the delegates to prevent the legislature from changing
the jurisdiction of the district courts by majority vote.'57 Second,
Article V, Section 16's language displays an evident intent to vest,
with some exceptions, original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal
matters in the district courts. The provision indicates an intent to
include all matters not criminal as "civil matters." Nothing in the
constitution suggests an intent to recognize a category of innominate
matters, separate from civil and criminal matters, that the legislature
could permissibly remove and assign to a non-Article V tribunal.
Since the 1914 inception of workers' compensation in the state,
claims for benefits have been adjudicated as civil matters by the
district courts. Consequently, Article V, Section 16's "civil matters"
includes workers' compensation cases.' 58
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the Act
effectively repealed the previously existing judicial remedy and
created a new administrative remedy, stating that while the legislature
could change or abolish the workers' compensation "remedy," it is
not free of constitutional limits over a particular remedy. 59 Thus, the
court indicated that although the legislature has the power to modify
or abolish unvested substantive rights and remedial rights or actions,
it cannot divest the constitutional jurisdiction that has already been
constitutionally extended to justiciable controversies involving those
rights, and that Act 938 of 1988 does not purport to alter or abolish
substantive rights or remedial rights but simply aims to transfer or
assign to a non-Article V tribunal the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over the adjudication involving those rights.
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that workers'
compensation involves public law and that the legislature is free to
create administrative jurisdiction in cases involving public rights. It
did so, however, by simply concluding that workers' compensation
is a matter of private right, the adjudication of which involves
disputes between private parties. 6 Thus, the court did not directly
answer the questions raised by the defendants' contention, viz.,
whether there is a constitutional distinction between public and
private rights, as has been recognized by the federal courts, and, if so,
is the legislature empowered to assign adjudicatory jurisdiction to
157. Id. at 79.
158. Id. at 80. Recently, in Pope v. State, 792 So. 2d 713 (La. 2001), the court
for similar reasons declared unconstitutional the Corrections Administrative
Remedy Procedure, La. R.S. §§ 15:1171-1179 (1992), as an invalid attempt to
divest district courts of original jurisdiction of inmates' tort claims against the state
and vest original jurisdiction in an administrative system within the Department of
Corrections and sheriffs' departments.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 80-81.
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non-Article V tribunals over public civil matters even after they have
been placed within the original jurisdiction of the district courts.
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal appears to be the
only state appellate court to address the "res nova" question of
"[w]hether the [federal] public rights doctrine has any application
under the Louisiana Constitution .... ",161 The court decided "to
refrain from adopting the federal public rights doctrine into the
jurisprudence of this state, as it conflicts with the intent and purpose
of the Louisiana Constitution."' 62 The first circuit based its decision
on the grounds that, inter alia:
While the Congress is authorized ... to establish federal
courts, the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the exercise of
such power except as authorized therein[;] . . . the
introduction of the public rights doctrine is unnecessary in
.. . Louisiana, as an adequate provision is made in our
constitution for the vesting of quasi-judicial powers in
administrative agencies[;] [and there are] additional
provisions in our constitution not present in the federal
constitution, expressly restricting legislative power to alter
the court system.... 163
Although three dissenting judges disagreed with the majority's
criticism of the public rights doctrine and identification of its
source, they did not dispute that its adoption would be res nova in
Louisiana, or expressly contend that it should be adopted.'
Perhaps even more significant, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in
reversing on other grounds, avoided any mention of the public
rights doctrine.'65
The Louisiana first circuit's decision rejecting the federal public
rights doctrine appears to have been well-founded. Louisiana has
not recognized the public rights doctrine in its substantive or
procedural law or jurisprudence. Louisiana and civil law scholars
have recognized the categories of public and private law for
analytical and academic purposes.' 66 The Louisiana courts have not
161. American Waste and Pollution Control Co.v. D.E.Q., 580 So. 2d 392, 402
(La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 588 So. 2d 367 (1991).
162. Id. at 407.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 408-411 (Watkins, Shortess, and'Foil, J., dissenting).
165. American Waste and Pollution Control Co. v. D.E.Q., 588 So. 2d 367 (La.
1991).
166. See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System Louisiana and Comparative
Law § 121, at 241 (2d ed. 1999):
For the purpose of systematic analysis of legal institutions, laws are
frequently classified into various branches that contain the basic rules
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held or suggested, however, that the mere analytical classification
of a law as public or private can affect or determine whether ajusticiable controversy involving substantive rights and remedial
rights created by the law falls within the original jurisdiction of the
district courts. Because "all civil matters" within the district courts'
original jurisdiction include all matters that are not "criminal" in
nature,' 6 justiciable controversies based on rights created by laws
classifiable as public, private, or both, necessarily come within thatjurisdiction. This appears to be the case in most jurisdictions.
Professor Dan B. Dobbs, in discussing public law and private law
remedies, observes:
Courts impose no across-the-board distinctions between
public and private law remedies. Remedial principles
remain the same, and public law remedies are, in the broad
sense, the same as those used in private law. For instance,
public agencies recover statutory damages, injunctions, and
even restitution of improper gains made by the defendant at
public expense. Private individuals, pursuing litigation of
public importance, recover the same general remedies.
Private plaintiffs recover both damages and injunctions in
civil rights cases, and private individuals may similarly
serve the public interest when they force a law violator to
disgorge or make restitution of his wrongful gains. 68
governing a group of institutions or related aspects of legal activity.
Accurate delimitation is, of course, unobtainable because the points of
contact among the various branches of law are numerous. Problems may
be considered in each branch from a different viewpoint, but subject
matter may be common to a number of branches, and there may be much
overlapping. Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of accurate
delimitation, certain broad analytical divisions may be established with a
degree of clarity and precision ....
See generally Allan Kanner, Public andPrivate Law, 10 Tul. Envt'l L.J. 235,236-
40 (1997); see id. at 254 ("[E]xpress legislation may expand individual rights, such
as where a citizen suit provision is added to public law."); 1 Planiol & Ripert,
Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 1, ch. 1, nos. 18-27, at 15-19 (La. St. L. Inst. trans.,
12th ed. 1959); see id. at no. 18:
It is difficult to establish a sharp division between the different branches
of the law. The points of contact are numerous. Many of the matters and
questions are common to two and sometimes three different branches,
where they are considered from different points of view. Nevertheless,
if precise limits are often lacking, the existence of the large divisions are
nonetheless beyond a doubt.
167. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d at 79-80 (La. 1990); see also John Devlin,
Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 314-18 (1990).
168. Dan B. Dobbs, I Dobbs Law of Remedies § 1.5, at 21 (2d ed. 1993)(footnotes omitted); see ("[W]hat is a public law issue is a matter of degree, but it
certainly includes private litigation brought to enforce civil rights or to litigate
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Similarly, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and the courts
do not impose any distinction with respect to jurisdiction or
procedure between private and public law based civil actions.
Moreover, to read such a distinction into Article V, Section 16(A),
would be inconsistent with the well-settled view that the district
courts are courts of general jurisdiction having original jurisdiction
over all criminal and non-criminal litigation, except as otherwise
provided by the constitution.'69
In addition to the lack of any basis in Louisiana law for the publi6
rights doctrine, the federal courts' own experience counsels against
its adoption. The public-private right dichotomy appears to have
originated with a statement by Justice Curtis in Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Company.1 70 The case concerned
whether summary executive enforcement, without resort to courts,
violates Article III or the due process clause. In no way did it address
the issue of whether Congress may determine to constitute a court as
a legislative or administrative court without regard to Article III1'
Justice Curtis justified executive execution on the basis of a
distinction between public and private rights: 71
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress [sic] may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it
may deem proper. 73
Justice Curtis made no reference to the language, history, or
values of Article III to support the dichotomy. Nevertheless, it was
subsequently used in the 1920s and 1930s by some cases which
suggested that Congress may disregard Article III in setting up
legislative courts if "public" rather than private rights are
involved. 174 Thereafter, the dichotomy fell into disuse until Justice
Brennan revived it as an "exceptional category" in his plurality
opinion in Northern Pipeline.75 But after the doctrine received
environmental issues, or issues about the disposal or management of public
resources.") Id. (footnotes omitted).
169. See, e.g., Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75, 79 (La. 1990); West v. Town
of Winnsboro, 211 So. 2d 665 (La. 1967); Tomas v. Conco Food Distributors, 666
So. 2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
170. 59 U.S. 272, (18 How.) 272 (1855).
171. Bator, supra note 96, at 247.
172. Id.
173. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284.
174. Bator, supra note 96, at 247.
175. Id.
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severe criticism from other justices and scholarly commentators, a
majority of the Court "rejected any attempt to make determinative
for Article III purposes the distinction between public rights and
private rights .... "
There may have been a practical justification for the public rights
doctrine when it was conceived and expanded by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court evidently embraced the public rights doctrine to
avoid requiring that Congress ordain and establish Article III courts
to handle all litigation within the territories, as well as customs
disputes and military courts martial. Congress used the public rights
doctrine during the New Deal and afterwards as authority for
providing Article I adjudicatory tribunals for the large number of
federal legislative courts and administrative agencies, rather than
creating an extraordinary number of Article IIIjudges with life tenure
and undiminishable salaries. Louisiana, however, has never had the
need for such expediencies. The classification of an individual's
legal right as a "public" right not worthy of initial adjudication by an
independent judiciary does not further the Article V goals of
upholding the constitution and the rule of law. There is equal need for
an independent and impartial judiciary to provide a check on the
political branches with regard to both public and private rights. With
the proliferation of statutory and administrative law, the advent of
entitlements, and the erosion of the right-privilege distinction, the
dichotomy between public and private rights has become virtually
meaningless. 177
176. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1985).
177. See Bator, supra note 96, at 250:
Justice Brennan's own confusing and contradictory formulations
demonstrate that the "public rights" category has no holding power
whatever. In the modem administrative state, suffused by statutory and
administrative schemes that characteristically create complex
interdependencies between public and private enforcement, it is
unintelligible and futile to try to maintain rigid distinctions between
questions of private and public rights. It may be that there was a time
when pure common-law actions could be characterized as involving
"only" private rights. But when an injured worker seeks statutory
workmen's compensation, is the claim one of purely "private" right?
(Does this depend on the formality of whether the insurance fund is
administered by the state or the employer?) Is a reinstatement and back
pay proceeding before the NLRB on account of an employer unfair labor
practice a matter of public or private right? What about a bankruptcy
trustee's action to set aside a preference? A citizen's suit to enjoin water
pollution? A Title VII discrimination case?
The fact is that there is no intelligent way to answer these questions.
And, in any event, the answer really has no bearing at all on the question
whether it is or is not appropriate to dispense with the trappings of article
III adjudication. For even if the "public rights" category were an
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Nor should the Supreme Court's functional-balancing
methodology be followed by Louisiana courts in interpreting Article
V. Although the Supreme Court in Schor took significant steps
toward giving substantive content to the functional-balancing
methodology, it is still an unstable and highly unpredictable
interpretive approach. It leaves the Court with vast ad hoc discretion
to uphold or strike down non-Article III tribunals, depending on its
own sense of institutional considerations.'78 This is because:
In doing so, the Court pits an interest the benefits of which
are immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one,
the benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and
thus often seem remote and not worth the cost in any single
case. Thus, while this balancing creates the illusion of
objectivity and ineluctability, in fact the result was
foreordained, because the balance is weighted against judicial
independence.... [A]s individual cases accumulate in which
the Court finds that the short-term benefits of efficiency
outweigh the'long-term benefits ofjudicial independence, the
protections of Article III will be eviscerated.'79
The Louisiana delegates and the electors struck a balance between the
power of the legislature to alter the framework of government and the
values of separation of powers, checks and balances, individual
constitutional rights, and the rule of law, to be enforced by an
independent elected judiciary. They drew bright lines clearly
establishing boundaries that the legislature may not cross to divest the
courts of matters within the original, appellate, and supervisory
jurisdiction of the courts. There is no authority in the constitution for
the legislature or the courts to employ a functional-balancing
methodology to strike a different balance or to revise the mutual
limits between the legislative and judicial powers. In Article IV, the
legislature is expressly granted a broad scope of power to enact laws
reallocating the functions, powers, and duties of all departments,
offices, agencies, and other instrumentalities of the executive
branch. 8' In Article V, however, because of the role of the judiciary
in providing an independent and impartial rule of law check upon the
political branches, the legislature is expressly denied the power to
alter the constitutionally established courts or theirjurisdiction.' 8' In
intelligible and manageable category (which it is plainly not), we still
have not been told why the category is congruent with cases where the use
of an article I court or administrative agency is valid.
178. Id. at 257.
179. Schor, 478 U.S. at 863-64, 106 S. Ct. at 3263.
180. See generally La. Const. art. IV.
181. See generally La. Const. art. V.
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Louisiana, therefore, a change in the structure or jurisdiction of a
court established by Article V requires a constitutional amendment.
Consequently, Louisiana's constitutional court system is quite
different in this respect from the federal system in which Congress
may ordain, establish, change or abolish inferior Article III courts and
grant, deny, or limit their jurisdiction within the ambit circumscribed
by Article III. The decision to make a change in the basic Louisiana
court system, and the balancing of values pro and con, must be made
preliminarily by the legislature, by a vote of two-thirds of the elected
members of each house, and finally by the electorate of the state. The
requirement of a constitutional amendment to alter the basic court
system provides assurance that the change is genuinely needed and in
the public's interest, and because a state constitutional amendment is
easier to obtain than a federal one, the requirement does not deprive
the system of sufficient flexibility when there is a legitimate need for
change. Article V was amended in 1990, creating an exception to the
district courts' original jurisdiction over worker's compensation
claims in response to a need perceived by the legislature and the
electors to deal with those matters initially in an administrative law
system. 12 Thus, there is no justification for Louisiana courts to
engage in a judicial weighing process to evaluate the legislature's
balancing of factors and proposed alteration to the general jurisdiction
of the courts; the electors voting on a proposed constitutional
amendment are the final arbiters of whether such a change should be
adopted.
Moreover, although legislative acts generally are presumed to be
constitutional unless proven otherwise,' it is also generally accepted
that the jurisdiction of a general jurisdiction court is presumed, unless
the contrary is made to appear."8 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court has
182. 1990 La. Acts No. 1098. Article V has been amended seven other times
since the 1974 constitution was adopted. A 1979 amendment clarified the instances
in which a juvenile may be tried as an adult. 1979 La. Acts No. 801. A 1980
amendment gave circuit courts of appeal jurisdiction over criminal appeals, except
for death penalty cases. 1980 La. Acts No. 843. A 1983 amendment extended the
time period for filling judicial vacancies. 1983 La. Acts No. 728. A 1987
amendment gave the state supreme court sole authority to appoint temporary or ad
hoc judges. 1987 La. Acts No. 945. A 1993 amendment allowed the legislature
to grant jurisdiction to a family court in certain cases. 1993 La. Acts No. 1040. A
1994 amendment added additional crimes for which a juvenile may be tried as an
adult. 1994 La. Acts No. 152. A 1999 amendment provided an exemption fromjury duty for persons who are seventy years of age or older. 1999 La. Acts No.
1406.
183. See Board of Louisiana Recovery Districtv. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384
(La. 1988).
184. See Conner v. Conner, 231 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Evans v.
Advance Sch., Inc., 388 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. 1 st Dist. 1979); Walles v. Int'l Bhd.
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recognized that the district courts are courts of general jurisdiction.I 5
Consequently, when a controversy arises as to whether the legislature
has properly asserted its power over a matter arguably within the
original jurisdiction of the district courts, the issue cannot be decided
on the strength of a presumption that the legislature is not
encroaching upon the independent powers of the judicial branch.
This naturally follows because the state constitution is not a grant of
power but instead is a division of the plenary power of the people of the
state into three branches of government." 6 Article V, pertaining to thejudicial branch, vests the judicial power of the state in courts that it
establishes, including the district courts.' Article V, Section 16
further provides that a district court shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil and criminal matters except as otherwise provided by the
constitution or except as provided by law for administrative agency
determinations in workers' compensation matters. Consequently, any
act of the legislature which allegedly without constitutional
authorization usurps the district court's jurisdiction should not be
presumed valid, but should be scrutinized closely and carefully solely
on its merits.
d.
There are cases, however, in which Article V, Section 16 places no
constraints upon the initial adjudication of a civil matter by a non-
Article V administrative tribunal. These are the exceptions that prove
the rule, viz., (1) civil matters adjudicated by other constitutionally
established and authorized tribunals, and (2) disputes concerning rights,
entitlements and obligations, created specifically as part of an
administrative or regulatory system, which traditionally have not been
considered as justiciable controversies cognizable under the original
jurisdiction of the district courts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Moore v. Roemer,' recognized
the first class of exceptions by noting that Article V, Section 16
provides that "original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters
is to be in the district courts 'unless otherwise authorized by the
constitution,' [and that there is] express authorization elsewhere in the
constitution for original jurisdiction in administrative bodies such as
the Civil Service Commission and Public Service Commission....,"89
Of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 252 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1977); see also Wright, supra
note 11, at § 3522.
185. West v. Town of Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1968).
186. See La. Const. art. II, § 1.
187. La. Const. art. V, § 1.
188. 567 So. 2d 75 (1990).
189. Id. at 79.
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Subsequent to Moore's holding that claims for worker's compensation
are civil matters of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
Article V, Section 16 was amended to except "administrative agency
determinations in workers' compensation matters," as provided by law,
from the district court's original jurisdiction.
In American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. State Department
ofEnvironmental Quality,19 ° the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized
the second class of exceptions, holding that the DEQ determinations
regarding waste disposal or water discharge permits
are not civil matters within the meaning... [and] scope of the
district courts' constitutional grant of original jurisdiction,
because waste disposal and water discharge permitting did not
exist as a traditional civil matter in 1974 and has never been
delegated in the first instance to the judicial branch, and
because such matters were thereafter constitutionally
delegated by the Legislature to the DEQ within the executive
branch.' 9'
The court further explained that the state's regulation of waste
disposal and water pollution historically had been statutorily vested
in the executive branch without creating justiciable rights or actions
cognizable by the district courts under their original civil matter
jurisdiction. In other words, the legislature may create an
administrative agency with regulatory and original adjudicatory
jurisdiction over a type of matter that traditionally has not- been
considered justiciable initially within the original jurisdiction of the
district court. 92 Prior to the establishment of the DEQ, such
questions had been resolved by other executive branch departments
without formal adjudicatory proceedings. The legislature's
reallocation of the permitting matters to the DEQ within the executive
branch did not constitute a subtraction of anything from the judicial
powers.' 93 Moreover, it would appear that many, if not most, issues
appropriately assignable to administrative agencies for initial
determinations would not present cases of a "judiciary" or
190. 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991).
191. Id. at373.
192. Id. at 371. Typically, the creation of an administrative body adds a new
rule-making and law-applying authority to the legal system, with no explicit
subtraction from the previously existing power of courts. Consequently, agencies
and courts are often considered to have concurrent or co-existing jurisdiction. See
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.1 (2d ed. 1983); see, e.g., Magnolia
Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991). The subject of co-
existing jurisdiction is not addressed in this essay. For an excellent discussion of
that topic and other issues related to the interplay of laws involving concurrent
judicial and administrative proceedings, see Kanner, supra note 166.
193. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 373.
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"justiciable" nature so as to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
district courts. 194
What is the meaning of Article V and what does it require of the
courts and the administrative tribunals in the adjudication and review
ofmatters constitutionally excepted from or never included within the
district courts' original jurisdiction? It is with regard to these classes
of cases that we may derive significant insight from the appellate
review model for interpreting federal Article III. Applying that
approach, it may be strongly argued that Article V, Section 1 requires
that the determinations by all administrative adjudicatory tribunals
must be reviewed by an Article V court at least for constitutional and
legal error and for a substantial evidentiary basis to support factual
findings.'95 If an administrative tribunal's faithful adherence to the
requirement of law is not subject to judicial review, separation of
powers values will be endangered.'9 6 "The fairness interests of
litigants may also be compromised insofar as [non-article V]
adjudicators are tempted by opportunities for self-aggrandizement or
are subject to political or other pressures."' 97
The absence of judicial review of alleged constitutional rights
violations that are justiciable controversies would severely damage
constitutional values in two ways. First, a central value of separation
of powers, "a judicial check against arbitrariness and self-
aggrandizement by [the legislature], the executive, and their
administrative agents," would be subverted.'98 Second, Article V's
194. See Wright, supra note 11, at § 3529 ("[I]t is recorded that Madison's
question whether jurisdiction of cases arising under the Constitution should be
limited to cases 'of a Judiciary Nature' was answered by a general supposition that
the jurisdiction given 'was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature"');
see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1949-50 (1968):
Embodied in the words 'cases' and 'controversies' are two
complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words
limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through
the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to
the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression
to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the
case-and-controversy doctrine.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S. Ct. 691, 700 (1962) (A court inquiring into
justiciability must decide "whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and
its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can
be judicially molded").
195. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 975-90.
196. Id. at 950.
197. Id. at950-51.
198. Id. at 975-76.
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interest in fairness to individual litigants, most heavily impacted
when constitutional rights are at stake, would be undermined.'99
Article V courts must also review all questions of law decided by
non-Article V tribunals.2"' "Administrative agencies, which are
neither electorally accountable nor insulated from political pressures
by the constitutional separation of powers, raise serious concerns of
legitimacy and accountability. 20' Added empirical worries arise
about the influence of powerful private groups and agencies'
tendencies to expand their bureaucratic power.
Measured by the foregoing appellate review theory standards, the
Louisiana courts have performed well in maintaining judicial
independence and providing a constitutional and rule of law check
and balance upon legislatively created adjudicatory tribunals. Even
in the absence of statutory authority, the right of judicial review of
administrative agency proceedings by an Article V court is presumed
to exist.203 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Buras v. Board of
Trustees of the New Orleans Police Pension Fund of the City of New
Orleans, a case governed by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution,
recognized that it was "well settled ... that the right of judicial
review is presumed to exist and the availability of such review is
necessary to the validity of administrative proceedings under our
legal system and traditions. 2 5  The court in Buras based its
constitutional holdings on "our legal system and [our] traditions," as
well as the due process and access to courts guarantees of the state
constitutions.2 06 Evidently, in addition to the constitution's
declaration of rights provisions, the court rested its decision on the
state constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and
balances, as well as the judiciary articles vesting the judicial power
and jurisdiction in the constitutionally established and authorized
courts, for the purpose of enforcement of all the constitutional
safeguards of individual freedoms.20 7 Consequently, the Louisiana
199. Id.
200. Id. at 976-77.
201. Id. at977-78.
202. Id. at 978.
203. Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 845-46, 253 So. 2d 200, 203 (1971)
("Generally the availability of judicial review is necessary to the validity of such
proceedings under our legal system and our traditions") (emphasis added).
204. 367 So. 2d 849 (La. 1979).
205. Id. at 851 n.4 (citing Bowen, 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 205 (1971) and La.
Const. art. 1, § 22). Accord Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So. 2d 330
(La. 1980) and Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 523 So. 2d 201,202 (La. 1988),
rev 'd in part on other grounds on rehearing, 523 So. 2d at 205-208; see American
Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. State, DEQ, 588 So. 2d 367, 371 (La. 1991).
206. See Bowen, 253 So. 2d at 203; Buras, 367 So. 2d at 851 n.4.
207. See La. Const. art. V, § 1; La. Const. art. VII, § 1 (1921).
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Supreme Court views the right of judicial review of administrative
agency determinations to be constitutionally required and essential
to the constitutional function of the courts in providing a
constitutional and rule of law check upon the political branches and
the administrative agencies.
Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court has required that
judicial review of agency adjudications must be searching and must
include application of standards substantially the same as those set
forth in the appellate review theory model and in the state
Administrative Procedures Act. In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. The
Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, °8 the court held that
there is no substantial difference between the standards of review
provided by § 964 of the Louisiana Administrative Procedures Act
(the "LAPA") and its ownjurisprudential rules pertaining tojudicial
review, which were developed by the court pursuant to its
constitutionally vested judicial power. 20 9 Accordingly, the court
stated that it would continue to apply the standards of judicial
review provided by § 964 by analogy even when not required by
statute.2'°
The court set forth the judicial review standards as follows:
Pursuant to § 964, a reviewing court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or
it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by
other error of law; (5) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion; or (6) manifestly erroneous in view
of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record.2
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Save Ourselves went on to
elaborate on the standards ofjudicial review and their application. 2
It is evident from the court's paraphrasing of the provisions of § 964
of the LAPA and its further elaboration on the application of each
standard that they must meet all of the requirements suggested by
208. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
209. Id. at 1158.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing La. R.S. 49:964(G)).
212. 452 So. 2d at 1158-60.
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the judicial review theory model for upholding Article III values
and the constitutional system of checks and balances and separation
of powers.1 3
Consequently, Article V has served as a worthy vehicle for the
preservation of judicial independence in the modem administrative
state. In retrospect, it is fortunate that the drafters of the judiciary
article of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution continued the safeguards
of judicial power and jurisdiction that were provided by the 1921
constitution. The delegates of the 1973 constitutional convention
wisely decided that those protective provisions were necessary
precautions against the political branches' inherent tendency toward
incursions on judicial independence. Article V, Section 16 affords
the district courts a broad original jurisdiction that in turn bolsters the
judicial branch courts as constitutional courts of general jurisdiction.
Fortunately, also, the drafters did not place anything in the
constitution that would detract from the resilience and genius of the
system of separation of powers and checks and balances that we have
inherited from the framers of the national constitution. Article V,
Section 1 vests the judicial power of the state directly in the courts
established and authorized by the judiciary article, assuring them a
sturdy constitutional foundation upon which to conduct a searching
appellate review of executive, legislative and administrative agency
determinations. Altogether, Article V provides an ample basis of
power by which the Louisiana judiciary may maintain its
independence, provide rule of law checks on administrative,
executive and legislative officers, and uphold the constitution for the
protection of individuals, minorities and the people as a whole.
CONCLUSION
This essay focuses on problems associated with the preservation
and exercise of independent judicial power under the state
constitution in conflict or competition with the quasi-judicial
functions of legislatively created administrative agencies. Insights
are suggested from the study of similar conflicts involving federal
agencies and federal Article III courts. It is recommended that
Louisianajurists and scholars avoid applying the federal public rights
doctrine and functional-balancing methodology to state constitutional
problems. These interpretive approaches were developed by the
United States Supreme Court in response to federal governmental
213. See In re Browning-Ferris Indus. Petit Bois Landfill, 657 So. 2d.633, 636
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 663 So. 2d 742 (1995) (providing an application
of appellate review standards).
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exigencies that have not arisen in Louisiana due to differences in
history, scale and court structure. Also, these federal approaches are
subject to the criticisms that they are inconsistent with the doctrines
of separation of powers, checks and balances, and an independent
judiciary, and that they are highly manipulable and unpredictable. On
the other hand, the work of scholars to preserve the objects and values
of these doctrines through an appellate review theory appears to have
beneficial application to Louisiana problems and to validate the
current rules and standards of Louisiana courts in appellate review of
administrative agency determinations. Finally, this essay concludes
that Article V, the Louisiana judiciary article, continues to serve as a
worthy vehicle by which Louisiana judges can maintain their
independence; enforce the doctrines of separation of powers, checks
and balances, and the rule of law with respect to administrative
agencies and the other branches of government; and uphold the
constitution for the protection of individuals, minorities and the
people as a whole.
